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Sick leave payments represent a signi￿cant portion of public health expenditures
and labor costs. Reductions in replacement levels are a commonly used instrument
to tackle moral hazard and to increase the e￿ciency of the health insurance market.
In Germany’s Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) system, the replacement level for
periods of sickness of up to six weeks was reduced from 100 percent to 80 percent
of an employee’s gross wage at the end of 1996. At the same time, the replacement
level for individuals absent for a long-term period, i.e., from the seventh week
onwards, was reduced from 80 to 70 percent. We show theoretically that the net
reform e￿ects on long-term absenteeism can be disentangled into a direct and
an indirect e￿ect. Using SOEP data, a natural control group, and two di￿erent
treatment groups, we estimate the net and the direct e￿ect on the incidence and
duration of long-term absenteeism by di￿erence-in-di￿erences. Our ￿ndings suggest
that, on population average, the reforms have not a￿ected long-term absenteeism
signi￿cantly, which is in accordance with our theoretical predictions, assuming
that employees on long-term sick leave are seriously sick. However, we ￿nd some
heterogeneity in the e￿ects and a small but signi￿cant decrease in the duration of
long-term absenteeism for the poor and middle-aged full-time employed persons.
All in all, moral hazard and presenteeism seem to be less of an issue in the right tail
of the sickness spell distribution. Finally, our calculations suggest that from 1997
to 2006, around ￿ve billion euros were redistributed from persons on long-term sick
leave to the SHI insurance pool.
Keywords: long-term absenteeism, sick pay, moral hazard, natural experi-
ment, SOEP
JEL classi￿cation: I18, J221 Introduction
The average number of sickness absence days per year and employee varies between
5 and 29 among the OCED countries (OECD, 2006). Average absence days are to
a large degree determined by long-term absence spells. In Germany, which lies in
the middle ￿eld of the ranking with 15 days, absence spells of more than six weeks
account for 40 percent of all absence days although they only represent 4 percent of
all sickness cases (Badura et al., 2008).
Sick leave payments play a central role in determining public health expendi-
tures and labor costs. Depending on the legislative framework, which di￿ers widely
from one country to the next, either the employer or the health insurance provider
compensates employees for foregone earnings. What is referred to in Europe as ￿sick-
ness absence insurance￿ is called ￿temporary disability insurance￿ in the US; in both
cases, however, it provides compensation for wages losses due to temporary non-work-
related illnesses or injuries. Yet the literature reveals a surprising gap of research on
such insurance programs and thus a relative paucity of ￿ndings ￿ particularly com-
pared to the vast literature on unemployment bene￿ts and unemployment duration.
The importance of sickness insurance programs can be seen on the example of the
US, where ￿ve states have such programs, among them the most populous state of
California. There, in 2005, the total sum of net bene￿ts for temporary disability
insurance amounted to $4.2 billion, while the total sum for unemployment insurance
amounted to $4.6 billion (Social Security Administration, 2006, 2008).
A common problem in insurance markets is moral hazard, which drives up insur-
ance costs and leads to an ine￿cient allocation of resources. With sick leave, moral
hazard exists if insured employees call in sick despite being able to work. Conse-
quently, full compensation of foregone earnings is seldom provided either by private
or by public health insurance systems.
This study exploits a natural experiment that occurred in Germany at the end
of 1996. At that time, compensation payments for long-term absentees with sickness
spells of more than six weeks reached the amount of 9.3 billion euros, comprising
7.3 percent of all expenditures by the German Statutory Health Insurance (SHI)
system. Employers ￿ who are legally obligated to pay employees for the ￿rst six
weeks of sick leave ￿ were forced to shoulder a burden of 28.2 billion euros (German
Federal Statistical O￿ce, 1998). In reaction, two health reforms were implemented,
both of which cut the level of paid sick leave. The main aim of this paper is to analyze
how these reforms a￿ected work absence spells of more than six weeks, and to what
extent moral hazard or presenteeism played a role in that part of the sickness spell
1distribution. Additionally, we calculate the SHI reform savings and redistributional
e￿ects.
At the end of 1996, sick leave compensation for the ￿rst six weeks was reduced
from 100 percent to 80 percent of foregone gross wages. The second reform came
into force at the beginning of 1997 and reduced the compensation level from 80 to 70
percent from the seventh week onwards. 1 Both reforms generate exogenous sources
of variation and yield testable implications. We analyze the causal e￿ects of the two
health reforms on long-term absenteeism.
To theoretically predict the e￿ects of both reforms on long-term absenteeism,
we employ a simple dynamic model of absence behavior. First, if moral hazard
plays a role and employees on long-term sick leave react to economic incentives,
long-term absenteeism should decrease as the direct costs of long-term absenteeism
unambiguously increase. Second, the costs of long-term absences decrease relative to
the costs of short-term absences. This indirect e￿ect would theoretically impact long-
term absenteeism in a positive way. However, under the assumption that employees
on long-term sick leave are indeed severely ill, the incentive structure of the sick pay
scheme would break down and individuals would not adapt their labor supply to
moderate cuts in sick pay.
Since Germany has two independent health care systems existing side by side,
we are able to de￿ne subsamples that were a￿ected by none, one, or both of the
reforms. Thus, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP)
and di￿erence-in-di￿erences methods, we can directly estimate the net e￿ect and the
direct e￿ect of the two reforms on the incidence and duration of long-term absence
spells. Since the legislator also decreased the upper limit of long-term sick pay from
100 percent to 90 percent of monthly net wages, the treatment intensity is likewise
exogenously varied. Hence, we are not only able to de￿ne treatment and control
groups but also to analyze the reform e￿ects by treatment intensity in relation to
gross wages.
We are con￿dent for several reasons that our study measures causal reform e￿ects.
First, the control and treatment groups are legally clearly de￿ned by political deci-
sions, and the e￿ect of the reforms on the individual was unambiguously exogenous.
Second, the legal regulations do not allow selection into or out of the treatment group.
Moreover, we control for many socioeconomic characteristics as well as health status,
which is by far the most important determinant of long-term absenteeism. Third,
due to the panel data format, the composition of the labor force can be considered.
1Henceforth, sickness spells that last less than six weeks are de￿ned as short-term absenteeism
and sickness spells that last longer than six weeks are de￿ned as long-term absenteeism.
2Finally, the reform e￿ects on the incidence and length of long-term absenteeism are
taken into account, and di￿erentiation by treatment intensity is possible.
Our results indicate that on average, the cut in replacement levels did not produce
an e￿ect on the incidence and duration of long-term sickness spells, either directly
or indirectly. This result is in line with our model predictions if we assume that
employees on long-term sick leave are indeed seriously ill. However, we ￿nd evidence
of heterogeneity in the e￿ects. For the poor and middle-aged persons employed full-
time, the duration of long-term absenteeism decreased signi￿cantly, although this
decrease was of small magnitude. In contrast to the previous literature, these ￿ndings
suggest that work absence behavior of more than thirty days is not very responsive
to economic incentives, which implies that moral hazard is of little importance in
this context. We calculate that the SHI saved around 5.5 billion euros due to the
cut in long-term sick pay from 1997 to 2006. Five billion thereof were redistributed
from the long-term sick to the insurance pool in order to achieve lower contribution
rates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
more background information on the sickness absence literature. Section 3 explains
the institutional features of the German health care sector, outlines the two health re-
forms, and describes the subsamples a￿ected by the health reforms. In Section 4, we
derive a theoretical explanation of how both reforms a￿ected long-term absenteeism,
expressed as a simple dynamic model of absence behavior. Section 5 describes the
data used and how our variables were generated, whereas our estimation and iden-
ti￿cation strategy is detailed in Section 6. Section 7 presents our estimation results,
which are discussed and summarized in Section 8.
2 Literature and Background
There is a large body of literature on absenteeism, but only a few studies explic-
itly analyze the role of sick leave regulations and the design of insurance contracts.
Some studies have modeled the determinants of sick leave behavior theoretically and
empirically (Jensen and McIntosh, 1999; Johansson and Palme, 1996), and others
have shown how workplace conditions a￿ect sickness absence (Dionne and Dostie,
2007; Ose, 2005). It is well documented that unemployment rates and absenteeism
are negatively correlated. This is due partly to changes in the composition of the
labor force; but behavioral factors seem to play a major role (Askildsen et al., 2005).
It has also been found that workers take sick leave more frequently after the end of
their probationary period, when full employment protection is provided (Lindbeck
3et al., 2006; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005; Riphahn,
2004). The theoretical paper by Chatterji and Tilley (2002) is one of the few that
has explicitly discussed the role of presenteeism as a possible source of behavioral
changes due to cuts in sick pay.
Only a handful of studies have empirically analyzed the relationship between ab-
sence behavior and compensation levels using only data from Sweden or the US. The
US studies solely focus on the workers’ compensation insurance which compensates
for work-related illnesses or injuries. Curington (1994) used US data on claim records
of ￿minor permanent partial impairments￿ and estimated the e￿ects of several leg-
islative changes in bene￿t levels on the length of work absences from 1964 through
1983. The results are mixed; some amendments induced changes in the work ab-
sence behavior, others did not. Another study from the US showed that increases in
workers’ compensation for ￿temporary total disabilities￿ due to work-related injuries
led to an increase in injury duration in several states in the US in the 80s (Meyer
et al., 1995). Johansson and Palme (2002) modeled the impact of a tax reform and
a reduction in replacement levels in the Swedish health insurance system in 1991 on
the hazard of work absences. They found that the increase in the absence costs re-
duced the incidence and length of sickness spells. Henrekson and Persson (2004) used
long time series data for Sweden and took advantage of several legislative changes
in the compensation levels to show that economic incentives strongly a￿ect absence
behavior. Pettersson-Lidbom and Skogman Thoursie (2008) showed that an increase
in the bene￿t levels in Sweden in 1987 led to an increase in the incidence of absence
spells. The study that comes closest to the one at hand was conducted by Johansson
and Palme (2005), who took the health reform in Sweden in 1991 as an exogenous
source of variation. They found that even for absence spells of more than 90(!) days,
employees adapt their absence behavior to changes in replacement levels. To our
knowledge, this was also the only study to date that has (indirectly) analyzed how
long-term absenteeism is a￿ected by reductions in replacement levels. However, all
published Swedish studies lack a sound control group, which makes it di￿cult to
disentangle the e￿ects of the sick pay cut from overall economic trends like the deep
recession in Sweden of 1991.
All in all, the existing literature suggests that sick people react to economic
incentives as classical economic theory would predict. These behavioral reactions
could be induced by moral hazard, where employees call in sick from work despite
being healthy, or presenteeism, where employees go to work despite being sick.
43 The German Health Care System And The Policy
Reforms
3.1 The Two Track German Health Care System
The German health care system actually consists of two independent health care
systems existing side by side. The more important of the two is the Statutory Health
Insurance (SHI) system, which covers about 90 percent of the German population.
Employees whose income from salary is below a politically de￿ned income threshold
(2007: e3,975 per month) are compulsorily insured under the SHI. High-income
earners who exceed that threshold, as well as the self-employed, have the right to
choose between the SHI, a private health insurance (PHI) provider, or remaining
uninsured. Non-working spouses and dependent children of individuals insured under
the SHI are automatically insured by the SHI family insurance at no charge. Special
groups such as students or unemployed are subject to special arrangements but are
mostly insured under the SHI. In principle, insurance coverage is the same for all
those insured under the SHI (German Ministry of Health, 2008).
The SHI is primarily ￿nanced by mandatory payroll deductions that are not
risk-related. These contributions are paid equally by employer and employee up to
a contribution ceiling (2007: e3,562.50 per month). Despite several health care
reforms that tried to tackle the problem of rising health care expenditures, the con-
tribution rates rose from 12.6 percent in 1990 to 13.9 percent in 2007, mainly due
to demographic changes, medical progress, and system ine￿ciencies. The SHI is
embedded in the German social legislation and is subject to the Social Code Book
V (German Federal Statistical O￿ce, 2008).
The second component of the German health care system is Private Health Insur-
ance (PHI). It basically covers private-sector employees who earn above the income
threshold, public sector employees, and self-employed persons. 2 Privately insured
people pay risk-related insurance premiums based on a health check-up at the be-
ginning of the insurance period. The premiums exceed the expected expenditures
in younger age groups as the health insurer makes provisions for rising expenditures
with increasing age. Coverage is provided under a variety of di￿erent health plans,
2 We need to distinguish two types of employees in the German public sector. First, there are
civil servants with tenure (called Beamte), henceforth called ￿civil servants.￿ They are primarily
PHI-insured since the state reimburses around 50 percent of their health expenditures ( Beihilfe)
and almost all of them insure the non-reimbursable expenditures privately. Second, we need to
consider employees in the public sector without tenure (called Angestellte im ￿￿entlichen Dienst).
They have some privileges, too, but are mostly insured with the SHI (under the same conditions
as everybody else). We call them ￿public servants.￿
5and insurance contracts are subject to private law. Consequently, in Germany, public
health care reforms a￿ect the SHI rather than the PHI.
It is important to note that once an optionally insured person opts out of the
SHI system, a return is virtually impossible. Employees above the income threshold
are legally not allowed to switch back, and employees who fall below the income
threshold in subsequent years may switch back but lose their provisions, which are not
transferable (neither between PHI and SHI, nor between the di￿erent private health
insurance providers). In reality, a change to a private health insurance provider
can be regarded as a lifetime decision, and switching between the SHI and the PHI
system as well as between private health insurance providers is very rare.
3.2 The German Sick Pay System
If an employee falls sick, a certi￿cate from a physician is required from the third day
of sick leave. The employer is legally obliged to pay sickness compensation up to
six weeks per sickness spell regardless of the employee’s health insurance. From the
seventh week onwards, the physician needs to issue di￿erent certi￿cates at reasonable
time intervals of usually one week, and sick leave is paid by the SHI or the PHI. The
replacement level for persons on long-term sick leave insured under the SHI is codi￿ed
in the social legislation and is the same for all those with SHI insurance. In 1996, SHI
payments for long-term absenteeism made up 7.3 percent of all SHI expenditures,
which equaled 9.3 billion euros (German Federal Statistical O￿ce, 1998).
The system for monitoring employees on sick leave is a potentially important
determinant of the degree of moral hazard in the insurance market. In Germany, the
￿Medical Service of the SHI￿ exists for this purpose. One of the original objectives of
the medical service was to monitor absenteeism. It is explicitly stated in the guide-
lines of this institution that long-term absenteeism in particular should be prevented
in order to reduce the risk of patients descending the social ladder (Medizinischer
Dienst der Krankenversicherung (MDK), 2008). The German social legislation stip-
ulates that the SHI is obligated to call upon the Medical Service to provide an expert
opinion, in order to dispel any doubts about work absences. Such doubts may arise if
the insured person is absent unusually often or repeatedly sick for short-term periods
on Mondays or Fridays. If physicians certify sickness uncommonly often, the SHI may
ask for an expert opinion. The employer also has the right to call upon the Medical
Service to provide an expert opinion. Expert opinions are based on available medi-
cal documents, information about the workplace, and a compulsory statement from
the patient. If necessary, the medical service has the right to examine the patient
6physically and to cut bene￿ts.3 In 1997, about 2,000 full-time equivalent employees
and independent physicians worked for the medical service and examined 1,719,386
cases of absenteeism (Medizinischer Dienst der Krankenversicherung (MDK), 2008).
3.3 The Policy Reforms
Two health reforms were implemented at the end of 1996. From October 1996 on, the
replacement level during the ￿rst six weeks of sickness was reduced from 100 percent
to 80 percent of foregone gross wages. 4 This reform had, at least theoretically, an
indirect in￿uence on sickness spells of more than six weeks and should therefore be
considered. A second health reform act became e￿ective on January 1, 1997. The
replacement level from the seventh week onwards was cut from 80 percent to 70
percent of foregone earnings for those insured under the SHI. 5 Figure 1 illustrates
the reduction in the replacement rates for short and long-term absence spells.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Sick leave payments for long-term absence spells are additionally limited by two
bene￿t caps. First, if the wage of an employee insured under the SHI exceeds the
legally de￿ned contribution ceiling, then long-term sick pay is limited to 70 (80)
percent of this contribution ceiling (2007: e0.7*3,562.50 per month) as contributions
are capped over this ceiling as well. Second, before 1997, the replacement level was
80 percent of the gross wage if the total amount did not exceed 100 percent of the net
wage. After 1997, the replacement level decreased to 70 percent of the gross wage
and the bene￿t cap to 90 percent of the net wage. These upper limits introduce
additional exogenous variation and allow us to generate an index that mirrors the
cut in long-term sick pay on a continuous scale from zero percent of gross wages to
10 percent of gross wages.
To deter people from substituting several short-term absence spells for a single
long-term absence spell, with the former compensated by a higher amount of sick
3 The wordings of the law can be found in the Social Code Book V, article 275, para. 1, 1a;
article 276, para. 5.
4 Passed on September 15, 1996 this law is the Arbeitsrechtliches Gesetz zur F￿rderung von
Wachstum und Besch￿ftigung (Arbeitsrechtliches Besch￿ftigungsf￿rderungsgesetz), BGBl. I 1996
p. 1476-1479. It became e￿ective at October 1, 1996. It should be noted that we are not able to
precisely identify those employees who were a￿ected by this law, as employers and unions voluntarily
agreed in some collective wage agreements to continue the old sick pay scheme. However, as this
reform is not the focus of this paper, this is of minor importance.
5 Passed on November 1, 1996, this law is the Gesetz zur Entlastung der Beitr￿ge in der geset-
zlichen Krankenversicherung (Beitragsentlastungsgesetz - BeitrEntlG), BGBl. I 1996 p. 1631-1633 .
7pay in total, the law on employer-provided sick pay contains a speci￿c passage. 6
The passage stipulates that if employees repeatedly have absence periods due to
the same illness, they are no longer entitled to 100 percent employer-provided sick
pay. Consequently, there is no incentive to substitute multiple short-term spells for
a single long-term spell.
We now de￿ne subsamples that have been a￿ected di￿erently by the two health
reforms, thereby serving as treatment and control groups in the evaluation of this
natural experiment. As the sickness compensation for long-term absence is paid for
by the health insurance and not by the employer, the second reform did not a￿ect
privately insured people, whose replacement levels are subject to individual insurance
contracts.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We can easily see from Table 1 that private-sector employees who were insured
with the SHI (subsample 1) were a￿ected by both reforms. In contrast, SHI-insured
public-sector employees (subsample 2) were a￿ected by the reduction in long-term
sick pay but not by the cut in short-term sick pay due to political decisions. The
same holds for SHI-insured trainees (subsample 3). The last two subsamples, PHI-
insured public-sector employees and self-employed persons, were not a￿ected by any
of the reforms. As Table 2 visualizes, we accordingly de￿ned two treatment groups
and one control group to estimate the net e￿ect and the direct e￿ect. The direct
e￿ect is de￿ned as the e￿ect that has been induced by the increase in the (direct)
costs of being long-term sick. The indirect e￿ect stems from the fact that the costs
for being long-term absent decreased relative to the costs of being short-term absent.
The net e￿ect is the sum of both e￿ects.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
4 A Dynamic Model of Absence Behavior
In the following, we analyze the absence behavior of an individual i within a two-
period model. We modify a model by Brown (1994) so as to be able to study the
6Gesetz ￿ber die Zahlung des Arbeitsentgelts an Feiertagen und im Krankheitsfall (Entgelt-
fortzahlungsgesetz - EntgFG), BGBl. I 1994 p. 1014, 1065 . Para. 3 contains the passage.
8theoretical e￿ects of the German health reforms on long-term absence behavior. The
individual’s utility function can be speci￿ed as:
ut = (1 − σt)ct + (σt)lt, t = t,t + 1; σt ∈ [0,1] (1)
where t is the time period, ct represents consumption in period t, and lt leisure in
period t. The sickness level in t is speci￿ed by σt, where larger values of σt represent a
higher degree of sickness. If the sickness index tends towards unity, i.e., a high level
of sickness prevails, the individual draws utility only from leisure or recuperation
time rather than consumption. On the other hand, if the sickness level is relatively
low, the individual attaches more weight to consumption as opposed to leisure. To
simplify the analysis, we assume that f(σt) follows a uniform distribution:
f(σt) =
(
1 if 0 ≤ σt ≤ 1
0 otherwise
This means that each sickness level is equally probable. At time t, individuals are
aware of their sickness level σt but concerning the subsequent period, only the prob-
ability distribution f(σt+1) is known.
To adequately model the German sick pay scheme, we de￿ne the replacement
level during long-term sickness spells as rl with 0 < rl < 1 and the replacement level
during short term sickness spells as rh with 0 < rh < 1. Moreover, rl < rh < w, where
w represents the gross wage and is normalized to one. Sick pay is always provided
when the individual is absent from work. Long-term sickness is when an individual
is on sick leave for at least two continuous periods. Hence, in the ￿rst absence period
after a working period, the sick pay is rh, which is reduced to rl in the second period.
If a working period follows a long-term sickness period, the replacement level for the
next sickness period is again rh.
A key feature of this simple dynamic model is the concept of the reservation
sickness level, σ∗
t, as introduced by Barmby et al. (1994). The reservation sickness
level is de￿ned as the value of σt such that an individual is indi￿erent between going
to work and staying home. To be more precise, at σ∗
t the utility from working in
period 1 plus the expected utility in period 2 equals the utility from being absent in
period 1 plus the expected utility in period 2. As we are primarily interested in the
reform e￿ects on long-term absenteeism, we assume that our individual was on sick
leave in t − 1 and is eligible for sick pay in t with rl as the replacement level. In t,







t+1 ) = (1 − σ∗
t)w + σ∗





The left hand side of this equation represents the utility in period t if the individual
continues to be on sick leave with sick leave compensation rl and leisure T, where
T is the total time available. The expected utility from period t + 1 is added and
discounted with the individual’s time preference rate ρ. Analogously, the right hand
side adds up the discounted utility in t+1 with the utility from working h hours and
enjoying T − h hours leisure in t.7
The individual decides whether to be absent from work by maximizing utility
over both periods. If σt > σ∗
t, i.e., the actual sickness level exceeds the reservation
sickness level, the individual stays away from work as more weight is placed on leisure
rather than consumption. In other words, if employees are seriously sick, they value
recuperation time far more than materialistic needs and go on sick leave. On the
other hand, if σt < σ∗
t, individuals maximize their utility by working h hours.
One has to bear in mind that the decision to be absent from work or not has
implications for the sick pay level in the next period. If individuals are absent from
work in t, they get rl in t as well as in t+1 if their sickness continues to be so severe
that σt+1 > σa∗
t+1, where σa∗
t+1 is the reservation sickness level in t + 1 conditional on
having been absent in t. If they work in t and fall sick in t + 1, with σt+1 > σw∗
t+1,
their sick pay is rh. Hence we can de￿ne E(Uabsent
t+1 ) which is the expected utility in
t + 1 conditional on having been absent at time t:
E(Uabsent
t+1 )



































































As can be seen from (4), the expected utility in t + 1 is expressed as the weighted
average of the expected utility from attending work and being absent from work.
The weights represent the probability that σt+1 is less than the reservation sickness
level and exceed the reservation sickness level, respectively. The expected values of
7 We assume a rigid employment contract without the possibility of working overtime or less
than the contracted hours h.
10consumption and leisure are evaluated by using the conditional probability distri-
bution. Conditional on σt+1 being between 0 and σa∗




2 for the uniform distribution, is taken to evaluate the utility of a work-





2 , is substituted into the utility function for an absent employee.
Equivalently de￿ned is E(Uwork
t+1 ) which is the expected utility in t+1 conditional
on having worked in t:
E(Uwork






















































∂rl < 0 and
∂σw∗
t+1
∂rh < 0, which means that a decrease in sick pay levels
has a positive impact on the reservation sickness levels, resulting, ceteris paribus, in
a lower probability to be absent from work. This is what we would expect intuitively
when the costs of sickness rise. Moreover, static labor supply models also predict a
decrease in absenteeism with decreasing sick pay rates (Brown and Sessions, 1996).
Henceforth, we call this the direct e￿ect of a reduction in sick pay.
As rl < rh < w, we get σa∗
t+1 > σw∗
t+1 meaning that the probability to work in t+1 is
higher for an employee who stayed home in t as opposed to an employee who worked
in t. The reason is that the gap between wages and sick pay, i.e., the cost of absence,
is bigger for long-term absenteeism as compared to a short-term absenteeism. This
is a reasonable approximation of the statutory sick leave regulations in Germany.













2(w − rl + h)(w − rh + h)
> 0 (8)
11We see that σ∗
t equals σa∗
t+1 plus a discounted positive term which we interpret as the
impact of future absence costs on the today’s decision to be absent from work or not.
It illustrates how the German sick pay scheme, which penalizes long absence spells
more severely than short absence spells, impacts the probability to stay at home in
the current period. In the case of a ￿at sick pay level, which would not depend on the
length of absence, the second term would vanish and the probability of being absent
from work today would equal the probability of being absent from work tomorrow.
Remember that this holds under the assumption that every health status is equally
probable and outside the individual’s in￿uence. Utility-maximizing individuals need
to take the impact of today’s absence behavior on future sick pay entitlements into
account.
We now predict how long-term absenteeism is a￿ected if the sick pay levels for
short and long absence spells decrease and the employee is entitled to rl in case of
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∂rl and an additional factor. Hence, it is crucial to consider the
impact of the discounted future term when evaluating the impact of a reduction in
rl. The second term represents the indirect e￿ect that arises from the gap in the
replacement levels between long and short-term absence spells, rh − rl. In case of a
￿at compensation scheme the gap closes and the indirect e￿ect disappears. Ceteris
paribus, a reduction in rl widens the compensation gap, increases future absence
costs, and thus a￿ects long-term absenteeism negatively, thereby strengthening the
direct e￿ect.
Now we consider a reduction in rh. Note that there is no direct e￿ect of a decrease
in rh for people in an ongoing long-term sickness spell. These people continue to get
rl if they remain absent, and get their full wage if they go back to work. However, a
reduction in rh would, ceteris paribus, diminish the compensation gap between short
















We now want to relax the rather restrictive assumption that the sickness level σt
12is independent of the sickness level in the previous period and that every sickness
level is equally probable in every period. Suppose that the sickness levels are serially
correlated and that rh is paid for sickness spells up to six periods. If the employee
continues to be on sick leave in the seventh period, rl is paid. For a sickness spell
to last more than six periods, the illness must to be so severe that σt > σ∗
t in every
period. If that is the case, the incentive structure of our sick leave scheme breaks
down and the employee is absent from work in every period. Hence, if employees are
seriously sick, which means that their degree of sickness tends towards unity, and the
replacement levels change only moderately without taking on extreme values, then
these employees do not react to economic incentives.
In Section 7, we empirically estimate the net e￿ect as well as the direct e￿ect of
the German health reforms on long-term absenteeism.
5 Data and Variable De￿nitions
The dataset that we use is the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The
SOEP is an annual representative household survey that was started in 1984 and
sampled more than 20,000 persons in 2006. Further details can be found elsewhere
(Wagner et al., 2007).
Depending on our empirical estimation strategy, we use data of the years 1994
to 1999. As our goal is to evaluate a reduction in wage compensation levels, we
drop non-working respondents and those who are not eligible for long-term sickness
compensation (i.e., people who earn less than 400 euros per month and working
students). Furthermore, we drop observations with missings and restrict our sample
to respondents aged 18 to 65.
5.1 Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
The SOEP contains various questions about the usage of health services and health
insurance. We generate our ￿rst dependent dummy variable, which measures the
incidence of long-term absenteeism, from the following question that was asked con-
tinuously from 1994 on: ￿Were you sick from work for more than six weeks at one
time last year?￿ Since sick pay is reduced after six weeks because it is no longer dis-
bursed by the employer but by the health insurance, and since a di￿erent certi￿cate
needs to be issued by the physician, measurement errors should play a minor role
here.
To measure how many days long-term sick pay was received, we use the following
13SOEP question: ￿How many days were you not able to work in 199X because of
illness?￿ We generate our second dependent variable by subtracting, for those who
had a long-term absence spell, the number of employer-paid sick days ￿ namely 30 ￿
from the total number of days absent. 8 9 Clearly, this duration variable is subject to
measurement errors as we assume that the respondents had no other absence spells.
Moreover, comparing the average duration of long-term sick pay with o￿cial data, it
becomes clear that we face a systematic underreporting in the survey data, as persons
with long-term sickness spells are less likely to participate in the survey. However, if
the cut in long-term sick pay did not a￿ect the probability to participate in the survey
and did not a￿ect the sickness spell distribution, this duration measure is su￿cient
to evaluate the reform e￿ects. While the former assumption clearly holds, one might
argue that the latter is more problematic. Those who were only a￿ected by the cut
in long-term sick pay have an incentive to interrupt their long-term sickness spell
and to start a new one. Luckily, we do not need to fear such behavioral e￿ects since,
according to German law, the claim for employer-provided sick pay expires in case of
such sickness spell substitutions (see Section 3.3 for more details). Once more, the
importance of having various treatment groups is emphasized here. By comparing
Treatment Group 1 with our controls, we cannot identify potential reform e￿ects,
since a negative impact on the duration measure might be caused by the decrease in
short-term sick pay. Contrasting Treatment Group 2, which was a￿ected only by the
cut in long-term sick pay, with the Control Group, and bearing in mind that sickness
spell substitutions are not of relevance here, we can reliably estimate the impact of
the reform on the length of long-term sickness spells.
As both questions on absenteeism refer to the last year, we take the information
of time variant covariates from the previous year if the respondent was interviewed
the year before. For respondents who were not interviewed in the previous year, we
take the current information and assume that it did not change meanwhile.
The whole set of explanatory variables can be found in Appendix A and is cat-
egorized as follows. A ￿rst group incorporates variables on personal characteristics,
8 As noted above, public servants enjoy special privileges. The period in which their employer
provides a 100 percent sickness compensation varies from 6 weeks to 26 weeks depending on seniority.
Since we have detailed information about the seniority levels, we are able to identify privileged public
servants and rede￿ne for them long-term absence spells which eventually coincide with the period
of the lower SHI sick pay. Hence, for public servants, we subtract the bene￿t days that are provided
by the employer and that vary between 6 and 26 weeks.
9 For those respondents who indicated having been absent for more than six weeks but who
reported a total number of sick days of less than 30, we replaced the values with a one. By
estimating a Zero-in￿ated Negbin-2 model (see Section 6.2) and predicting the bene￿t days, we
imputed the values for respondents with a missing on the bene￿t day variable. We imputed the
values only for respondents who indicated that they were on long-term sick leave and who had no
missings on the other relevant variables.
14like the dummies on gender, immigrant, East Germany, partner, married, children,
disabled, good health, bad health, no sports, and age (age2). The second group
consists of educational controls such as the degree obtained, the number of years
with the company, and whether the person was trained for the job. The last group
contains explanatory variables on job characteristics. Among them are blue-collar
worker, white-collar worker, the size of the company , and the monthly gross wage.
5.2 Control Group, Treatment Groups, and Treatment Inten-
sity Indices
As described in Section 3.3 and visualized in Table 2, we generate one control group
and two treatment groups. For each of the treatment groups we compute a treatment
index that represents the treatment intensity. By these means, we estimate the net
and the direct reform e￿ects.
The SOEP is very detailed about the insurance status and the workplace of the
respondents, which allows us to precisely assign them to the control and treatment
groups. However, self-employed persons insured under the SHI have the option to
opt out of long-term sick pay in order to obtain lower contribution rates. As we are
unable to identify respondents with such contracts, we drop them.
Another advantage of the SOEP is the extensive data about gross wages, net
wages, and variable income components such as Christmas or vacation bonuses. The
SOEP group deals precisely with the problem of missing income data, and imputes
values thoroughly (Frick and Grabka, 2005). Thanks to this information and the
legally de￿ned upper limits for long-term sick pay, we are able to accurately generate
treatment indices that display the decrease in replacement levels continuously from
0 to 10 percent of individual gross wages.
We ￿rstly specify three treatment dummy variables. Treatment Group 1 is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent belongs to Treatment Group 1 and 0
if the respondent is in the Control Group. Treatment Group 2 is a dummy variable
that takes on the value 1 for respondents in Treatment Group 2 and 0 for respondents
in the Control Group. Finally, Treatment Group 3 has a 1 for people belonging to
Treatment Group 2 and a 0 for people belonging to Treatment Group 1. In our basic
speci￿cation, Treatment Group 1 contains 16,006 observations, Treatment Group 2
has 6,500 observations, and the Control Group contains 2,693 observations.
Beside the universal rule that long-term sick pay is 70 (80) percent of the gross
wage up to the contribution ceiling, legally de￿ned upper limits induce an additional,
continuous, and more precise source of exogenous variation. The maximum amount
15of long-term sick pay was restricted to 100 percent of the net wage before the reform
and to 90 percent of the net wage after the reform. Depending on the individual
gross and net wages for those being treated, we can calculate the individual decrease
in long-term sick pay in percent of the gross wage. Hence, the treatment intensity
varies from 0 percent of the gross wage for those una￿ected by the reform to a
maximum decrease of 10 percent of the gross wage. We generate a continuous variable
called Treatment Index 1 that has the value 0 for those in the Control Group and
values from 0.57 (percent) up to 10.00 (percent) for those in the Treatment Group
1. Equivalently built is Treatment Index 2, which includes people in the Control
Group and Treatment Group 2. The density of both variables Treatment Index 1
and Treatment Index 2 peaks around 6 (percent) and 10 (percent). About 80 percent
of the treated faced a cut in long-term sick pay between 4 and 8 percent, and about
12 percent experienced a cut of 10 percent.
6 Estimation Strategy and Identi￿cation
6.1 Probit Speci￿cation
To estimate the causal reform e￿ects on the incidence of long-term absence spells,
we ￿t a di￿erence-in-di￿erences (DiD) probit model of the following type:
Pr(yit = 1) = Φ(α + βp97t + γDit + δDiDit + x
0
itζ) (11)
with i representing individuals and t representing time. The dummy p97t has a one
for post-treatment years and a zero for pre-treatment years. The treatment dummy
variable Dit indicates whether respondents belong to the treatment or the control
group. Depending on the speci￿cations, we use the variables Treatment Group 1,
Treatment Group 2, Treatment Group 3, Treatment Index 1, or Treatment Index 2,
respectively, which were explained in the previous subsection. The variable DiDit
can be interpreted as the interaction term between Dit and p97t. Consequently,
it always has the value zero for individuals in the control group as well as for the
treated in pre-treatment periods. The vector x0
it includes all personal, educational,
and job-related controls as well as year dummies, state dummies and a variable for
the state unemployment rate in a given year. Since we control for a rich set of
observable characteristics this approach is a parametric conditional DiD estimation
as compared to the nonparametric conditional DiD procedure proposed by (Heckman
16et al., 1997). Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal
distribution.
The marginal e￿ect of the interaction term DiDit delivers us the causal reform
e￿ect and is henceforth always displayed when output tables are presented. 10
6.2 Count Data Speci￿cation
The second empirical speci￿cation intends to estimate how the policy reform a￿ected
the length of long-term absence spells in post-treatment periods. As the number of
bene￿ts days is a count with excess zero observations and overdispersion, i.e., the
conditional variance exceeding the conditional mean, we ￿t count data models. Based
on the Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria as well as on Vuong
tests, we found two model speci￿cations to be appropriate.
The ￿rst is a Hurdle-at-Zero Negative Binomial Model, also simply referred to as
a two-part model, which models two distinct statistical processes for the incidence
and the duration of long-term absenteeism. The ￿rst part represents the probability
of crossing the hurdle, e.g., of being absent long-term, and can be estimated by a
logit or probit model equivalent to that in equation (11). The second part models the
duration of long-term absenteeism by ￿tting a truncated at zero Negative Binomial-2
(NegBin-2) model (Deb and Trivedi, 1997).
The second count data model to be employed is the so-called Zero-In￿ated Nega-
tive Binominal Model that equally allows diverging statistical processes for the inci-
dence and duration of long-term absenteeism. The underlying statistical mechanism
di￿erentiates between employees on long-term sick leave and those not on long-term
sick leave, and assigns di￿erent probabilities that are parameterized as functions of
the covariates to each group. The binary process is again speci￿ed in form of a
logit or a probit model, and the count process is now modeled as an untruncated
NegBin-2 model for the binary process to take on value one. Hence, zero counts may
be generated in two ways: as realizations of the binary process and as realizations of
the count process when the binary process is one (Winkelmann, 2008).
Both count data models incorporate the negative binomial distribution. The rea-
son is that, in contrast to the more restrictive Poisson distribution, it does not only




∆p97∆D is not of relevance in nonlinear models when the interest lies in the
estimation of a treatment e￿ect. Using treatment dummy variables, the average treatment e￿ect
on the treated at the time of the treatment is given by
∆Φ(.)
∆(p97*D) = Φ(α+βp97t +γDit +δDiDit +
x0
itζ) − Φ(α + βp97t + γDit + x0
itζ) which is exactly what we calculate and present throughout the
paper.
17take excess zeros into account but also allows for overdispersion and unobserved het-
erogeneity. The NegBin model can be seen as a special case of a continuous mixture
model. In the notation of Cameron and Trivedi (2005), the NegBin distribution can
be described as a density mixture of the following form:
ϕ(y|µ,α) =
Z























where f (y|µ,ν) is the conditional Poisson distribution and γ(ν|α) is assumed to
be gamma-distributed with ν as an unobserved parameter with variance α. Γ(.)
denotes the gamma integral and µ = exp(Xβ) where the matrix X incorporates the
same variables as the probit model in equation (11). The NegBin can be derived in
di￿erent ways; it has di￿erent variants and di￿erent interpretations. Note that in
the special case of α = 0 the NegBin collapses to a simple Poisson model.
6.3 Identi￿cation
The core identi￿cation assumption in every DiD model is the common time assump-
tion. It assumes that the estimated e￿ect is due entirely to the policy intervention
and that in the absence of the intervention and conditional on the covariates, the
outcome variable of the treated group would have developed in the same way as the
outcome variable of the controls. Depending on the context, this may be a more
or less strong assumption. Our identi￿cation strategy is based on various pillars,
making us con￿dent that we have reliably identi￿ed causal reform e￿ects.
First, we should point out that we use a distinct control group that was not
a￿ected by the reforms. Additionally, the identi￿cation of two di￿erent treatment
groups that were a￿ected by a single and both reforms, respectively, makes it possible
to distinguish between direct and net reform e￿ects. Since the insurance status of the
respondents as well as their job characteristics and earnings are collected accurately,
we can assign people very precisely to the control and treatment groups.
Second, we exploit an additional source of exogenous variation which allows us to
distinguish e￿ects by treatment intensity (see Section 3.3 for more details). By using
income information that di￿erentiates between gross wages, net wages, and fringe
bene￿ts, we are able to generate treatment intensity variables remarkably exactly.
18In the period under observation, the implementation of the reform and the variation
in the treatment intensity were clearly exogenous to the individuals and politically
determined. We have not found evidence that the policy change was endogenous
in the sense that the reform was a reaction to increasing absence rates (Besley and
Case, 2000; German Federal Statistical O￿ce, 2008). Rather, it was a fairly random
means of cutting health expenditures and was used mainly as an instrument of the
unpopular Kohl administration, which took o￿ce in 1982, to demonstrate strength
and capacity to act.
Third, as in almost every study that builds upon natural experiments, the control
group and the two treatment groups di￿er signi￿cantly with respect to most of the
observed characteristics (see Table 3). For example, in comparison to the Control
Group, Treatment Group 1 includes fewer females but more immigrants, and the em-
ployees are less educated. Treatment Group 2 is younger than the other subsamples,
less often married, and includes more white-collar workers without tenure. The het-
erogeneity in most of the observable characteristics is due to the federal regulations
of the German health insurance and hence unavoidable. However, we argue that it is
very unlikely that the common time trend assumption is violated as a) the di￿erences
in characteristics are not the result of treatment-related self-selection but politically
determined, b) we have a very rich dataset and are able include a variety of controls,
c) the key determinant of long-term absenteeism is the health status, which we are
able to control for. Recall that it poses no problem if the subsamples have di￿er-
ent probabilities of being a￿ected by long-term sickness; the identifying assumption
would only be violated if unobservables existed that would impact the change of
these probabilities di￿erently. In case of long-term absenteeism it is di￿cult to think
of unobservables that have a diverging e￿ect on the dynamic of the outcome ￿ all the
more after having controlled for a rich set of health-related, personal, educational,
and job-related covariates as well as the annual regional unemployment rate, regional
time-invariant e￿ects, and annual time trends.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
We can see from Table 4 that relatively few covariates a￿ect long-term absen-
teeism signi￿cantly. More educated employees are less often absent for long-term
periods, and ￿rm size is positively correlated with long absence spells. As expected,
the most important driver of long-term absenteeism is health status. This is not
surprising since the main reasons for long-term absences are persistently low health
stocks and health shocks like unexpected illnesses and accidents (M￿ller et al., 1998).
19[Insert Table 4 about here]
Figure 2 reinforces our presumption of the validity of the common time trend
assumption. As for long-term sick leave duration and the pre-reform periods, the
two treatment groups as well as the control group show an almost parallel time
trend.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Fourth, we not only estimate the reform e￿ects on the incidence of long-term
absenteeism but also the e￿ects on the length of long-term absence spells. Although
we work with survey data, which makes it possible to take a rich set of background
variables into account (at the cost of having no detailed spell data), we have good
arguments why the available sick absence information is su￿cient (see Section 5.1).
Fifth, to prove the consistency of our results, we perform various robustness
checks. Thanks to the panel structure, we are able to control for the labor force
composition by using balanced panels. Moreover, we experiment with di￿erent pre-
and post-reform years and pool the data over only two years. Additionally, we restrict
the sample size to singles, persons aged 25 to 55 employed full-time, and split the
sample at the median wage.
In recent years, there has been an extensive debate about the drawbacks and
limitations of DiD estimation. A particular concern is the underestimation of OLS
standard errors due to serial correlation in case of long time horizons and unobserved
(treatment and control) group e￿ects. To deal with the serial correlation issue, we
focus on short time horizons. As Bertrand et al. (2004) have shown, the main source
for understating the standard errors stems from serial correlation of the outcome
and the intervention variable and is basically eliminated when focusing on less than
￿ve periods. While there is consensus about the serial correlation problem, the issue
with unobserved common group e￿ects is still a matter of considerable debate. If
one takes the objection of Donald and Lang (2007) seriously, then it would not be
possible to draw inferences from DiD analyses in the case of few groups, meaning that
no empirical assessment could be performed. We subscribe to the view of Wooldridge
(2006), who says of the study by Donald and Lang (p. 18):
￿DL criticize Card and Krueger (1994) for comparing mean wage changes of fast-food workers
across two states because Card and Krueger fail to account for the state e￿ect (New Jersery or
Pennsylvania) [...]. But the DL criticism in the G = 2 case is no di￿erent from a common question
raised for any di￿erence-in-di￿erences analyses: How can we be sure that any observed di￿erence
20in means is due entirely to the policy change? To characterize the problem as failing to account for
an unobserved group e￿ect is not necessarily helpful.￿ 11
Besides our focus on short time spans to resolve serial correlation concerns, we use
robust standard errors and correct for clustering at the individual level throughout
the analysis.
Finally, an important feature of this study is that there is no selection into or
out of the treatment group, which is a central issue in other settings, e.g., when
labor market programs are evaluated. Switching between the two diverse health care
systems that were a￿ected di￿erently by the reforms is not allowed for the great
majority. We are able to identify the only subsample that has this right and exclude
it in our robustness checks.12
Our basic empirical strategy is thus to pool the data for the years 1995 to 1998 and
to estimate DiD probit as well as count data models where we employ the variables
Treatment Group 1 to 3 as well as Treatment Index 1 and 2, respectively.
7 Results
7.1 Baseline Speci￿cations
Table 5 provides the unconditional DiD estimate of the reform’s net e￿ect and
direct e￿ect on the incidence of long-term absenteeism. The unconditional long-term
absence rate fell for Treatment Group 1 from 6.16 percent in the pre-treatment years
1995 and 1996 to 5.92 percent in 1997 and 1998. The rate for Treatment Group 2
fell from 3.77 to 3.56 percent. Without the availability of a control group and by
11 In this very readable extended version of an older published AER paper (Wooldridge, 2003),
Wooldridge (2006) discusses several other shortcomings and assumptions of the estimation approach
proposed by Donald and Lang (2007). In another place, Wooldridge (2007) asks rhetorically whether
introducing more than sampling error into DiD analyses was either necessary or desirable. ￿Should
we conclude nothing can be learned in such settings?￿ , he questions (p. 3). Moreover, he uses the
well known Meyer et al. (1995) study as another example:
￿It seems that, in this example, there is plenty of uncertainty in estimation, and one cannot obtain
a tight estimate without a fairly large sample size. It is unclear what we gain by concluding that,
because we are just identifying the parameters, we cannot perform inference in such cases. In this
example, it is hard to argue that the uncertainty associated with choosing low earners within the
same state and time period as the control group somehow swamps the sampling error in the sample
means.￿ (p.3 to 4).
12 The only group that has the right to opt out of the SHI is that of optionally insured employees
(self-employed and high-income earners above the income threshold). However, it is very unlikely
that employees opted out of the SHI as a reaction to the cut in long-term sick pay. Opting out is
a lifetime decision that is practically not feasible for the elderly due to extremely high premiums
and that makes no sense for the young since they are very likely to be una￿ected by long-term
absenteeism anyway. We consider the possibility that selection out of the treatment played a role
in Section 7.
21means of before-after estimators one could erroneously attribute the total decrease
to the reform. However, the absence rate for the Control Group also fell from 3.49
to 3.11 percent, resulting in overall di￿erence-in-di￿erences estimates of +0.13 and
+0.17 percent, respectively. Table 6 shows the same estimates for the duration of
long-term absence spells. The average number of bene￿t days per insured person
fell from 3.62 to 3.17 days for Treatment Group 1 and from 2.58 to 1.95 days for
Treatment Group 2. It also decreased slightly from 1.98 to 1.95 days for the Control
Group leading to unconditional DiD estimates of -0.42 and -0.61 days.
[Insert Table 5 and 6 about here]
The DiD estimator is now incorporated into a regression framework. Table 7
reports the results from six model speci￿cations that di￿er with respect to the in-
clusion of additional controls and measure the impact on the incidence of long-term
absenteeism. Each speci￿cation represents a probit model equivalent to equation
(11) with a dependent variable that is 1 if the respondent had a long-term sickness
spell in the previous year and zero otherwise. The variable of interest is displayed
as DiD1 and consists of an interaction between the dummy Treatment Group 1 and
the year dummy p1997. In every speci￿cation, marginal e￿ects are calculated and
displayed. In none of the model speci￿cations is the DiD estimate statistically dif-
ferent from zero. The estimated coe￿cients are very close to zero, 0.0063 in the
preferred speci￿cation, and positive. Note that there was no time trend in 1997 that
signi￿cantly a￿ected the absence rates, and that the DiD coe￿cients are robust to
the inclusion of covariates and close to the unconditional DiD estimates. This can
be interpreted as an additional evidence for a common time trend.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
In the next step, we disentangle the net e￿ect of the reform into a direct e￿ect
and an indirect e￿ect, and estimate their impact on the incidence of long-term absen-
teeism separately. As has been shown theoretically in Section 4, this is crucial since
it may be that the indirect reform e￿ect compensated the direct e￿ect, rendering the
net reform e￿ect insigni￿cant and highlights the importance of the separate analysis
displayed in Table 8. Column 1 once again shows the net e￿ect; the regression model
equals Model 6 in Table 7. Column 2 displays the direct e￿ect of the reduction in
long-term sick pay on the absence rate. Again, we used equation (11) but in contrast
to column 1, Treatment Group 2, i.e., those only a￿ected by the cut in long-term sick
22pay, has been interacted with the post-reform year dummy to get the DiD2 estimate.
It is easy to see that the DiD2 coe￿cient is statistically not di￿erent from but close
to zero, which is also the case for DiD3 in column 3 where we used Treatment Group
3 which contrasts those solely a￿ected by the cut in long-term sick pay with those
a￿ected by both reforms.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Treatment Index 1 and 2 represent the treatment intensity of the reform, namely
the cut in long-term sick pay as a percentage of the individual’s gross wage. As
before, we use these variables to estimate the net e￿ect as well as the direct e￿ect of
the reforms on the incidence of long-term absenteeism. And as before, we are unable
to reject the hypothesis that the di￿erence-in-di￿erences estimate is statistically dif-
ferent from zero. Note that all DiD point estimates are practically zero (see Table
9).
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Table 10 gives us the DiD estimates when we use the number of days that long-
term bene￿ts were received as dependent variable and estimate count data models
using Treatment Index 2. The non-signi￿cant point estimate for the whole sample
is -0.041, and conditional on those who had a long-term absence spell, it is -0.904
(days). To sum up, we do not ￿nd evidence that the reforms had an overall signi￿cant
impact on absenteeism ￿ either on the incidence or on the length of long-term absence
spells.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
One piece of ￿eyeball evidence￿ supporting this conclusion is descriptive statistics
from the German Federal Statistical O￿ce. These statistics show a slight decrease
from 93.87 bene￿t days per case and SHI insured in 1996 to 88.93 bene￿t days in
1997 which lies within the usual ￿uctuation range (e.g. 1995: 86.47) and is in line
with our results (German Federal Statistical O￿ce, 2008).
7.2 Robustness Checks and Heterogeneity in E￿ects
Until now our estimation strategy was to pool the data over four years, which means
that we allowed the sample composition to change over the years. As people with
23long-term absence spells have a higher probability to leave the labor force as a result
of their (probably severe) illness, we should check whether this selection out of the
labor market distorted our results. From those who had a long-term absence spell
in 1996, 7.1 percent did not answer the questionnaire one year later for unknown
reasons (one respondent died and one moved abroad). We do not ￿nd evidence
that long-term illness led to a higher probability of dropping out of the sample in
the subsequent year, since 7.7 percent of the respondents without long-term absence
spells did not participate in the following year. One the other hand, 74.6 percent
of those who were absent for a long-term period in 1996 were employed full-time at
that time, whereas one year later, this number decreased to 62.3 percent for those
who remained in the sample.13 Especially if we had found a signi￿cant reform e￿ect,
one could have argued that the estimate was biased and caused by selection out of
the labor market. There are several reasons why this selection e￿ect is only of minor
importance in our setting.
First, in light of the selection, it is even more remarkable that we do not ￿nd
signi￿cant reform e￿ects. Second, in 1998 (with information about 1997) the SOEP
group drew a random refreshment sample that covered all existing subsamples and
a total of 1,067 observations (Wagner et al., 2007). Thanks to this refreshment
sample, the employment status distribution over those who had long-term sickness
spells in 1996 and 1997 remained very stable. Under the consideration of the new
observations, in total 73.1 percent of those who su￿ered long-term absence spells in
1997 were employed full-time (as compared to 62.3 percent without considering the
refreshment sample).14
Third, through the availability of a control group that we observe over time, we
are able to control for treatment-independent selection out of the labor market. 15 In
the absence of a control group one could easily confuse the illness-related selection
out of the labor market with a causal reform e￿ect, since it is natural that sickness
absence rates decrease over time as the sample ages.
Finally, as we use panel data, we can take account of labor force composition by
using a balanced sample. In the following, we perform additional tests to prove the
robustness of our results and to check whether heterogeneity in the reform e￿ects
13 The ratio of full time employed who were not absent for long-term periods was 71.9 percent
in 1996 and 72.6 percent in 1997.
14 For the other employment status groups, the deviation was less than 1.6 percent.
15 We cannot, however, entirely exclude the possibility that the reform had an e￿ect on the
decision to leave the labor market voluntarily. We are unable to observe how large the share of
voluntary labor market quitters was. However, as the cut in long-term sick pay was moderate
and ￿nancial penalties are substantially higher for unemployed or retirees, we believe that reform-
induced selection out of the labor market plays a negligible role.
24is of importance. Table 11 reports results for the direct e￿ect speci￿cation on the
incidence of long-term absenteeism using Treatment Index 2.
[Insert Table 11 about here]
As a ￿rst test, we center the data two years around the reform (column 1). Af-
terwards, we restrict our sample to the years 1996 and 1997, balance it, and consider
only employees who were eligible for long-term sick pay in both years and answered
the SOEP questionnaire in both years (column 2). An alternative robustness check
would be to take 1995 as reference year and contrast it to 1997 and 1998. It might
be that pull-forward e￿ects played a role and that people adapted their behavior in
1996, when the reform plans were made public (column 3). However, this is not very
probable as many catalysts of long-term absences happen unexpectedly. Since people
who started their long-term absence spell in 1996 and carried it over to 1997 took
advantage of a transitory arrangement and were not exposed to reduced sick pay,
we contrasted the years 1995/1996 and 1998 in column 4. Another check would be
to restrict the sample to full-time employed people aged 25 to 55 (column 5) and to
singles (column 6) as the income of other household members may have an impact on
the exposure to treatment. On the household level, the relevant parameter might be
the decrease in total household income rather than individual wages. Since option-
ally SHI insured could have switched to the PHI system as a reaction to the reform,
we exclude all optionally insured people in column 7. We also split the sample at the
median gross wage (columns 8 and 9). As can be seen easily in Table 11, none of the
di￿erence-in-di￿erences estimates is statistically signi￿cant and all point estimates
are very close to zero in magnitude.
[Insert Table 12 about here]
We employ the same speci￿cations with the number of bene￿t days as dependent
variable and estimate count data models using Treatment Index 2. As can be seen
in Table 12, we ￿nd signi￿cant and negative reform e￿ects on the length of long-
term absence spells for middle-aged full-time employed and the poor, which suggests
heterogeneity in the reform e￿ects. Middle-aged full-time employed people most
likely need to support a family and might be the main earners in their household. The
poor are also likely to be more crucially dependent on their full salary, which would
imply that the reform induced a higher degree of presenteeism in these subsamples.
On the other hand, the poor are more likely to work in less satisfying jobs and, thus,
the reform might have reduced the degree of moral hazard as well.
25According to the estimates, a one unit increase in Treatment Index 1 which equals
an increase in the absence costs of about 5 percent, led to a decrease in the average
number of bene￿t days per case of around 0.04 and 0.11, respectively.
[Insert Table 13 about here]
Besides displaying graphs on the outcome variable trends by treatment status,
another standard method for checking the robustness of DiD estimates is to perform
placebo regressions and to estimate the reform e￿ects for years without a reform.
For the assumption of common time trends of control and treatment group to hold,
none of the placebo reform e￿ects should be signi￿cant. Table 13 displays placebo
regression results on the incidence and duration of long-term absenteeism for the
years 1994 to 1996. All placebo estimates turn out to be insigni￿cant.
[Insert Table 13 about here]
7.3 Calculation of SHI Reform Savings
In this subsection we calculate the total amount that the SHI has saved from 1997
to 2006 through the cut in long-term sick pay. The sum re￿ects the redistributional
e￿ect of the reform; reducing the replacement level for the long-term sick bene￿ts
the rest of the statutory health insurance pool through lower contribution rates.
For every eligible individual and the years 1997 to 2006, we calculate the sick pay
according to the old and the new regulations, take the di￿erence, and sum over the
frequency-weighted number of long-term absences for the whole period. The long-
term sick pay amounted to 80 percent of the monthly gross wage before the reform
and to 70 percent after the reform up to the contribution ceiling. The bene￿t cap
decreased from 100 percent of the monthly net wage before the reform to 90 percent
after the reform.
Already in 1995, the German Federal Constitutional Court ( Bundesverfassungs-
gericht) pronounced the common practice to calculate long-term sick pay to be un-
constitutional.16 The Court criticized that those insured under the SHI would be
forced to pay contribution rates on lump-sum payments like Christmas or vacation
bonuses (up to the contribution ceiling) but that these lump sum payments would
not be considered in the calculation of the sick pay. However, the legislator ignored
16 The judgment was pronounced at January 11, 1995 and is categorized under BVerfGE 92, 53.
26these objections when passing the reform bill at the end of 1996. From 1997 to
2000, sick pay was calculated without considering lump-sum payments, but several
Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht) actions were ￿led. In 2003, the Federal
Social Court judged in favor of the plainti￿. 17 The claimants whose sick pay was
miscalculated between January 1, 1997 and June 22, 2000 were set a time limit of
about ￿ve months to make an application for reimbursement of their miscalculated
sick pay. From June 22, 2000, on, lump sum payments were considered (up to the
contribution ceiling) in the calculation of long-term sick pay.
As it is unknown how many percent of the claimants ￿led an application within
this rather restrictive time frame, our calculation speci￿cations assume both full
and zero reimbursement. Another question is whether the cut in long-term sick pay
sensitized the population and caused the lawsuits. To deal with these unknowns,
we formulate three scenarios. Speci￿cation I assumes that zero reimbursement of
the miscalculated sick pay was provided ￿ if no reform had taken place as well as
in reality. Speci￿cation II assumes full reimbursement of the miscalculated sick pay
which equals the assumption that lump sum payments have been considered from
1997 onwards. Both speci￿cations assume independence of the cut in long-term sick
pay and the lawsuits. Speci￿cation III assumes that there had not been a change in
the basis of calculation without the reform and that in reality, the change became
not e￿ective until 2000.
We take advantage of the rich SOEP dataset that not only provides generated
gross and net income measures but also provides the sum of yearly bonuses per
employee. In a ￿rst step, we calculate the amount of long-term sick pay that every
eligible individual would receive per day according to the pre- and the post-reform
regulations and our three speci￿cations. Observations with nonsense income data
were dropped.18
In a second step, we use administrative data from the German Ministry of Health
on the total number of SHI long-term sick pay cases and the average number of bene￿t
days for SHI-insured people. Every statutory health insurance provider (2006: 253)
is legally obligated to ￿le information about the insured person and the bene￿ts
provided. The data are collected, aggregated, and published by the German Ministry
of Health. Unfortunately, only the total number of long-term sickness cases and
the average length of sick pay received is available. No personal data or income
information is collected. Hence, we combine administrative data with the SOEP
17 The judgement was pronounced at March 25, 2003 and is categorized under B 1 KR 36/01 R.
18 We dropped respondents who claimed to be employed full-time and to earn less than e400
per month. Additionally, we dropped part-time employees who claimed to earn less than e200 per
month.
27dataset, which contains very detailed income information.
Comparing the frequency-weighted number of SHI long-term sickness cases in the
SOEP with the administrative data reveals that the SOEP slightly underestimates
the number of cases as well as the average bene￿t days per case. This is not surprising
since especially long-term sick people with very long sickness spells have a higher
probability of not participating in the survey.
Now consider Table 14. All values are expressed in euros and in￿ation-adjusted,
with 2005 as the reference year. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the estimates
according to our three model speci￿cations. The ￿rst row displays the di￿erence
between the average sick pay per case when the pre- and the post-reform regulations
are compared. The sick pay per day and individual a￿ected is calculated with SOEP
data and is then multiplied by the average number of bene￿t days for those who
had a long-term absence spell according to the Ministry of Health (2006: 76.07 days
per case). Through the reform, the long-term sick pay has been cut on average
by approximately e300 per case and year. Since (reduced) social contributions are
charged on long-term sick pay, the net cut per case was about e250. Given that
the average number of bene￿t days equals about 2.5 months, this translates into a
monthly net cut of about e100, which represents about seven percent of the average
monthly net wage.
[Insert Table 14 about here]
The second row presents the estimates when we consider the frequency-weighted
long-term absence cases in SOEP. All eligible SHI-insured people are included; since
we slightly underestimate the total number of cases, we take these estimates as the
lower bound. According to these estimates, the SHI expenditures decreased between
4.3 and 5 billion euros as a result of the reform. The third row displays the total
amount saved when we only consider compulsorily SHI-insured who are employed 19
and use administrative data on the number of cases instead of SOEP data. These
values can also be seen as lower bound estimates. Row four, by contrast, shows
the estimates when we consider all SHI-insured who are eligible for long-term sick
pay according to o￿cial statistics. 20 All in all, we estimate that the total reform-
induced SHI health expenditure savings from 1997 to 2006 was between 3.8 and
19 Students and (early) retirees are not considered although they might be eligible under special
conditions.
20 These values sighlty overestimate the true e￿ect since short-term unemployed, who are eligible
for long-term sick pay, are included. However, in theory, we would need to di￿erentiate between
two types of unemployed with long-term sick pay. First, if people become unemployed during their
sickness, they receive long-term sick pay according to their last wage and are a￿ected by cuts in sick
pay. These people are of interest for us and they are included in row four as well as in the SOEP if
285.7 billion euros depending on the assumptions. When considering all eligible SHI-
insured people and assuming that the change in the calculation basis was independent
of the reform and full reimbursement of miscalculated sick pay was provided, our
estimate yields a total SHI saving sum of 5.62 billion euros. Under this speci￿cation,
deducting social contributions yields a net loss for the long-term sick of about ￿ve
billion euros.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
Economists often assume that moral hazard is responsible for a signi￿cant fraction
of workplace absences, thereby contributing to rising health expenditures and labor
costs. If this assumption holds true, it justi￿es reductions in sick pay replacement
levels, which would eventually lower absence rates and durations, increase e￿ciency
in the insurance market, and decrease health expenditures and labor costs. Several
countries with public health insurance systems have indeed reduced the replacement
levels for sick pay in recent years. Concurrently, various studies have found that
people adapt their short-term absence behavior to economic incentives, providing
evidence of the existence of a considerable degree of moral hazard in the decision to
go on sick leave.
The aim of this study has been to analyze the causal e￿ects of cuts in sick pay on
long-term absenteeism. In Germany, two health reforms came into force at the end
of 1996. The ￿rst reduced the compensation level for the ￿rst six weeks of receiving
sick pay from 100 percent to 80 percent of foregone gross wages. The second reduced
the compensation level from the seventh week onwards from 80 to 70 percent.
We show that within a simple dynamic model of absence behavior, the net e￿ect of
the two reforms on long-term absenteeism is a priori unclear, as it is composed of two
diverging e￿ects. The direct e￿ect increases the costs of being absent for long-term
periods and leads to a decrease of long-term absenteeism. The indirect e￿ect has a
positive impact on long-term absenteeism since through the two reforms, the costs
of being absent for a long term decreased relative to the costs of being absent for a
short term. The reform e￿ects are derived under the assumption that the individuals’
sickness levels are independent of previous periods and that every sickness level is
equally probable. If we relax this assumption and assume that employees who are
sick for long-term periods are seriously ill, the sick pay incentive structure breaks
they became unemployed during the calendar year prior to the interview. However, the second type
of unemployed are those who become long-term sick during their unemployment period. In that
case, they receive long-term sick pay which equals the unemployment bene￿ts. Those unemployed
were not a￿ected by the cut in long-term sick pay but are included in row four.
29down and employees who are sick long-term do not change their absence behavior as
a reaction to moderate cuts in replacement levels.
The identi￿cation and estimation of the direct as well as the net e￿ect is feasible
by di￿erence-in-di￿erences. SOEP data and the two-tiered health insurance system in
Germany allow us to identify subsamples that were a￿ected by both reforms, only by
the reduction in long-term sick pay, and by neither reform. Moreover, the legislator
de￿ned an upper limit for long-term sick pay that decreased from 100 percent of
net wages to 90 percent of net wages as a consequence of the reform. Hence, an
additional source of exogenous variation is provided that does not only allow us
to assign employees to treatment and control groups but also makes it possible to
di￿erentiate by treatment intensity in percent of the gross wage. Every part of
the reform was distinctly exogenous to the individual and politically determined.
Moreover, selection into or out of the treatment is not an issue here, as switching
between the SHI and the PHI is not allowed due to rigid legal restrictions.
Our empirical ￿ndings suggest that the health reforms have, for the population
average, not led to a signi￿cant change in the incidence and length of long-term
absence spells. These results are robust to various speci￿cations. Although we
do not ￿nd general reform e￿ects, we ￿nd evidence of heterogeneity in the e￿ects.
According to our estimates, the reform induced signi￿cant decreases in the length of
long-term sickness spells for the poor and middle-aged employees employed full-time.
The ￿nding that the long-term sick have not adapted their sickness behavior to
the monetary reform incentives in a signi￿cant manner is in line with our model
predictions if long-term sick people are assumed to be seriously ill. This is plausible
since, in Germany, the most common causes for sickness spells of more than six weeks
are chronic diseases of the spine, arthritis, accidents, cancer, and mental diseases.
Moreover, 43 percent of the persons concerned have strong or very strong fears of
being laid o￿ and becoming unemployed (M￿ller et al., 1998). Interestingly, our
results are in contrast to a study from Sweden that found absence behavior to be
a￿ected considerably by economic incentives even when absence spells of more than
90 days are assessed. The di￿erences in the ￿ndings might be due to a) cultural
peculiarities, e.g. Germans are said to have a particularly strong work ethic, b)
di￿erent monitoring systems for sick leave, c) di￿erent reform settings, e.g. in this
study, on average, the treated faced a monthly long-term sick pay cut of e100 or
seven percent of their net wage, d) the application of di￿erent econometric techniques,
e.g., in contrast to the Swedish study, we do not rely on before-after estimates but
use a control group.
By combining SOEP income data with administrative data, we estimate the total
30SHI reform savings from 1997 to 2006 to lie between 3.8 and 5.7 billion euros in real
terms as of 2005. The most realistic scenario yields a sum of about ￿ve billion euros
that was redistributed from the long-term sick to the insurance pool in order to
achieve lower contribution rates.
Various pieces of evidence throughout this study allow us to infer that moral
hazard is of minor importance when sickness spells of more than 30 days are consid-
ered. Consequently, health reforms like the German one do not lead to more e￿cient
sickness insurance markets by decreasing moral hazard but are merely an instrument
to cut health expenditures or labor costs. On the other hand, if introduced together
with with moderate cuts in replacement levels, this cost containment instrument
seems to be economically e￿cient in the sense that it induces no major behavioral
changes that might lead to undesirable equilibria. Policy makers should be aware of
the reform e￿ects and the redistributional consequences. It is simply a normative
question whether this instrument to cut health expenditures should be applied.
Further research on how sickness absence, moral hazard, and presenteeism are
related to the design of insurance contracts is essential as it has short and long-term
consequences for health expenditures, health outcomes, labor costs, and productivity.
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35Table 1: De￿nition of Subsamples
Reduction Sickness
Compensation < 30
days (paid by employer)
Reduction Sickness
Compensation > 30
days (paid by SHI)
Private-sector employees with SHI (1) yes yes
Public-sector employees with SHI (2) no yes
Trainees with SHI (3) no yes
Public-sector employees with PHI (4) no no
Self-employed with PHI (5) no no
Table 2: Overview Treatment and Control Groups
E￿ect to be estimated Treatment groups Control group
Net e￿ect subsample (1) subsamples (4) + (5)
Treatment Group 1
Direct e￿ect subsamples (2) + (3) subsamples (4) + (5)
Treatment Group 2







Long-term absent 0.033 0.060 0.026
Long-term absent bene￿t days 1.965 3.392 2.249
Personal characteristics
Female 0.410 0.366 0.587
Age 40.57 39.86 37.48
Age square/100 17.58 17.01 15.60
Immigrant 0.097 0.215 0.112
East Germany 0.166 0.258 0.378
Partner 0.762 0.803 0.650
Married 0.673 0.696 0.569
Children 0.483 0.470 0.435
Disabled 0.033 0.052 0.053
Good health 0.648 0.607 0.604
Bad health 0.080 0.099 0.104
No sports 0.287 0.409 0.331
Educational characteristics
Dropout 0.021 0.050 0.044
Degree after 8 years of schooling 0.230 0.357 0.271
Degree after 10 years of schooling 0.290 0.330 0.438
Degree after 12 years of schooling 0.051 0.035 0.035
Degree after 13 years of schooling 0.363 0.115 0.162
Other degree 0.046 0.112 0.051
Work in job trained for 0.608 0.545 0.511
New job 0.204 0.179 0.179
No. of years in company 10.29 9.04 8.79
Job characteristics
No tenure 0.106 0.051 0.273
One man ￿rm 0.099 0.000 0.000
Small company 0.327 0.274 0.169
Medium company 0.179 0.312 0.281
Big company 0.126 0.221 0.290
Huge company 0.268 0.193 0.260
Self employed 0.308 0.000 0.000
Blue collar worker 0.112 0.528 0.190
White collar worker 0.150 0.472 0.579
Public sector 0.493 0.000 0.829
Civil servant 0.395 0.000 0.031
Self employed 0.307 0.000 0.000
High job autonomy 0.506 0.160 0.152
Gross income per month 2,383.16 2,012.98 1,674.95
Regional unemployment rate 11.49 12.04 13.07
N 2,693 16,006 6,500
37Table 4: Probit Model: Determinants of Long-Term Absenteeism
Variable Coe￿cient Standard Error
Personal characteristics
Female (d) -0.001 0.003
Age 0.000 0.003
Age squared/100 0.000 0.001
Immigrant (d) 0.004 0.005
East Germany (d) -0.012 0.011
Partner (d) 0.006 0.004
Married(d) -0.008* 0.005
Children (d) -0.006** 0.003
Disabled (d) 0.034*** 0.007
Good health (d) -0.026*** 0.003
Bad health (d) 0.076*** 0.007
No sports (d) 0.007** 0.003
Educational characteristics
Degree after 8 years’ of schooling (d) -0.006 0.006
Degree after 10 years’ of schooling (d) -0.008 0.007
Degree after 12 years’ of schooling (d) -0.018*** 0.007
Degree after 13 years’ of schooling (d) -0.013** 0.006
Other degree (d) -0.003 0.007
Work in job trained for (d) -0.001 0.003
New job (d) 0.006 0.004
No. of years in company -0.000 0.000
Job characteristics
No tenure last year (d) -0.009** 0.004
Medium size company (d) 0.0012*** 0.004
Big company (d) 0.015*** 0.004
Huge company (d) 0.014** 0.005
White collar worker (d) -0.013*** 0.003
High job autonomy (d) -0.008* 0.004
Gross wage per month/1000 -0.005** 0.002
Regional unemployment rate 0.003 0.002
Year 1996 (d) 0.004 0.004
Year 1997 (d) -0.004 0.006




(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
marginal e￿ects, which are calculated at the means of the covariates, are displayed
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: dummy that is 1 if respondent had long-term absence spell; probit model is estimated
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person id
Regression includes state dummies
Left out reference categories are dropout, blue collar worker, and small company
38Table 5: Unconditional Di￿erence-in-Di￿erences Estimate on the Incidence of
Long-Term Absenteeism
1995/1996 1997/1998 Di￿erence Di￿-in-Di￿
Treatment Group 1 0.0616 0.0592 -0.0024 0.0013
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0078)
Treatment Group 2 0.0377 0.0356 -0.0020 0.0017
(0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0082)
Control Group 0.0349 0.0311 -0.0038
(0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0069)
Average incidence rate of long-term absenteeism is displayed
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 6: Unconditional Di￿erence-in-Di￿erences Estimate on the Average Number of
Long-Term Absent Bene￿t Days
1995/1996 1997/1998 Di￿erence Di￿-in-Di￿
Treatment Group 1 3.6212 3.1747 -0.4464 -0.4219
(0.2455) (0.2277) (0.3344) (0.7358)
Treatment Group 2 2.5800 1.9461 -0.6339 -0.6094
(0.3407) (0.2689) (0.4304) (0.7836)
Control Group 1.9767 1.9522 -0.0245
(0.4194) (0.4546) (0.6177)
Average number of long-term absent bene￿t days is displayed
Standard errors in parentheses
39Table 7: Di￿erence-in-Di￿erences Estimation on the Incidence of Long-Term Absenteeism
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
DiD1 (d) 0.0035 0.0024 0.0053 0.0032 0.0061 0.0063
(0.0119) (0.0108) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0088) (0.0086)
Post reform dummy (d) -0.0012 -0.0123 -0.0133 -0.0102 -0.0117 -0.0102
(0.0124) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0123)
Year 1996 (d) 0.0064 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0001
(0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Year 1997 (d) -0.0032 -0.0051 -0.0042 -0.0057 -0.0049 -0.0047
(0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0041)
Treatment Group 1 (d) 0.0276*** 0.0244*** 0.0151** 0.0219*** 0.0145*** 0.0124**
(0.0062) (0.0057) (0.0063) (0.0059) (0.0053) (0.0059)
Educational characteristics no no yes no no yes
Job characteristics no no no yes no yes
Personal characteristics no no no no yes yes
Regional unemployment rate no yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies no yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.0049 0.0091 0.0308 0.0258 0.1046 0.1153
χ2 30.368 51.609 187.191 153.235 704.315 780.916
N 18699 18699 18699 18699 18699 18699
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal e￿ects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for Treatment Group 1 (=1), Post reform dummy (=1), Year 1996 (=0), and Year 1997 (=1)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: dummy that is 1 if respondent had long-term absence spell; every column represents one probit model

















Treatment Group 3 (d) -0.021***
(0.006)
Post reform dummy(d) -0.010 0.007 -0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.004)
Year 1996 (d) 0.000 0.016* 0.002
(0.005) (0.009) (0.003)
Year 1997 (d) -0.005 0.009 -0.003
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
Educational characteristics yes yes yes
Job characteristics yes yes yes
Personal characteristics yes yes yes
Regional unemployment rate yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes
R-squared 0.115 0.106 0.114
χ2 780.916 298.763 1074.389
N 18699 9193 22506
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal e￿ects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for Treatment Group 1 (2, 3) (=1),
Post reform dummy (=1), Year 1996 (=0), and Year 1997 (=1)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: dummy that is 1 if respondent had long-term absence spell; every column represents one probit model
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person id











Treatment Index 2 0.000
(0.002)
Post reform dummy(d) -0.005 0.011
(0.010) (0.012)
Year 1996 (d) 0.000 0.016*
(0.005) (0.009)
Year 1997 (d) -0.005 0.009
(0.004) (0.007)
Educational characteristics yes yes
Job characteristics yes yes
Personal characteristics yes yes
Regional unemployment rate yes yes




(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal e￿ects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for Post reform dummy (=1),
Year 1996 (=0), and Year 1997 (=1)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: dummy that is 1 if respondent had long-term absence spell
Every column represents one probit model
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person id
42Table 10: DiD Estimation on the Duration of Long-Term Absenteeism







Treatment Index 2 0.043 1.188
(0.044) (1.006)
Post reform dummy(d) -0.402 -16.524
(0.642) (24.307)
Year 1996 (d) -0.064 1.509
(0.275) (10.047)
Year 1997 (d) 0.242 0.071
(0.326) (14.345)
Educational characteristics yes yes
Job characteristics yes yes
Personal characteristics yes yes
Regional unemployment rate yes yes
State dummies yes yes
χ2 149.552 108.45
N 9193 327
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal e￿ects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for Post reform dummy (=1), Year 1996 (=0),
and Year 1997 (=1)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: Number of long-term bene￿t days; every column represents one count data model
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person id















DiD2 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Educational characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Job characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personal characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional unemployment rate yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.096 0.123 0.084 0.089 0.095 0.110 0.079 0.118 0.101
χ2 145.022 126.841 167.372 217.029 144.648 113.32 207.033 212.115 166.736
N 4595 3239 6786 6827 5204 2747 8435 4833 4289
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal e￿ects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for Post reform dummy (=1), Year 1996 (=0), and Year 1997 (=1)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: dummy that is 1 if respondent had long-term absence spell; every column represents one probit model















DiD2 -0.021 0.130 -0.035 -0.025 -0.041*** 0.063 -0.093 -0.114** -0.048
(0.053) (0.123) (0.039) (0.024) (0.020) (0.072) (0.071) (0.023) (0.049)
Educational characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Job characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personal characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional unemployment rate yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
χ2 4608.620 1933.945 5256.873 2111.791 2478.681 222.277 235.314 2332.530 6751.009
N 4571 3334 6786 6812 5186 2798 8435 4833 4289
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal e￿ects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for Post reform dummy (=1), Year 1996 (=0), and Year 1997 (=1)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: number of long-term bene￿t days; every column represents one Zero-In￿ated NegBin-2 Model





DiD96 (d) 0.001 -0.042
(0.003) (0.159)
DiD95 (d) -0.003 -0.171
(0.005) (0.277)
DiD94 (d) -0.010 -0.503
(0.010) (0.945)
Educational characteristics yes yes
Job characteristics yes yes
Personal characteristics yes yes
Regional unemployment rate yes yes
State dummies yes yes
χ2 339.092 264.462
N 11457 11457
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal e￿ects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for corresponding post reform dummies (=1),
pre-treatment(=0), and post-treatment years (=1))
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: number of long-term bene￿t days; every column represents one Zero-In￿ated NegBin-2 model
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person id
46Table 14: Total Amount Saved by SHI Due to Reform: 1997-2006
Average: 1997-2006 Speci￿cation I Speci￿cation II Speci￿cation III
(1) (2) (3)
SHI reform savings per case 267 309 302
Total amount redistributed:
Frequency weighted SOEP cases 4.266.472.300 4.967.670.277 4.874.958.639
Total amount redistributed:
Compulsorily insured 3.832.975.534 4.473.828.845 4.391.214.903
(Federal Statistical O￿ce)
Total amount redistributed:
All eligible SHI insured 4.892.101.168 5.632.182.856 5.735.520.006
(Federal Statistical O￿ce)
Source: SOEP, German Ministry of Health, own calculations
All values are in Euro, in￿ation-adjusted (2005=100), and weighted
Speci￿cation I assumes zero reimbursement of the miscalculated sick pay ￿ if no reform had taken place as well as in reality
Speci￿cation II assumes full reimbursement of the miscalculated sick pay ￿ if no reform had taken place as well as in reality
Speci￿cation III assumes that there wouldn’t have been a change in the basis of calculation at all, if the reform had not
been implemented; in reality, zero reimbursement of the miscalculated sick pay is assumed (1997 - 2000).Appendix A
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Long-term absence 0.051 0.221 0 1 25199
Long-term absent bene￿t days 2.944 19.732 0 335 25199
Treatment Group 1 0.856 0.351 0 1 18699
Treatment Group 2 0.707 0.455 0 1 9193
Treatment Group 3 0.289 0.453 0 1 22506
Treatment Index 1 5.699 2.755 0 10 18699
Treatment Index 2 4.652 3.32 0 10 9193
Personal characteristics
Female 0.427 0.495 0 1 25199
Age 39.322 11.154 18 65 25199
Age squared/100 16.707 9.067 3.24 42.25 25199
Immigrant 0.176 0.381 0 1 25199
East Germany 0.28 0.449 0 1 25199
Partner 0.759 0.428 0 1 25199
Married 0.661 0.473 0 1 25199
Children 0.463 0.499 0 1 25199
Disabled 0.05 0.218 0 1 25199
Good health 0.611 0.488 0 1 25199
Bad health 0.098 0.298 0 1 25199
No sports 0.376 0.484 0 1 25199
Educational characteristics
Drop out 0.045 0.208 0 1 25199
Degree after 8 years’ of schooling 0.321 0.467 0 1 25199
Degree after 10 years’ of schooling 0.354 0.478 0 1 25199
Degree after 12 years’ of schooling 0.037 0.188 0 1 25199
Degree after 13 years’ of schooling 0.154 0.361 0 1 25199
Other degree 0.089 0.285 0 1 25199
Work in job trained for 0.543 0.498 0 1 25199
New job 0.182 0.386 0 1 25199
Continued on next page...
48... Table 15 continued
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
No. years in company 9.106 9.217 0 47.9 25199
Job characteristics
No tenure 0.114 0.318 0 1 25199
One man company 0.011 0.104 0 1 25199
Small size company 0.253 0.435 0 1 25199
Medium size company 0.289 0.454 0 1 25199
Big company 0.229 0.42 0 1 25199
Huge company 0.218 0.413 0 1 25199
Blue collar worker 0.396 0.489 0 1 25199
White collar worker 0.465 0.499 0 1 25199
Public sector 0.267 0.442 0 1 25156
Civil servant 0.05 0.218 0 1 25199
Self-employed 0.033 0.178 0 1 25199
High job autonomy 0.195 0.396 0 1 25199
Gross wage per month 1965.35 1106.54 204.00 40903.35 25199
Regional unemployment rate 12.25 3.97 7 21.7 25199
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